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In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent’s belief about 
relevant events, e.g. about other agents’ behavior. A growing number of surveys and 
experiments asks participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the 
causal relation between beliefs and actions. This paper discusses the possibility of creating 
exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by informing the agent about 
exogenous manipulations of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments 
where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied. The 
procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. 
The IV-estimated effect is signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the causal role of beliefs.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In subjective expected utility theory and related models, the agent’s expectations can be viewed as a pure as-if construct, 
meaning that expectations are no more than an elegant way of summarizing choice data. Choice is represented by a hypo-
thetical function of expectations—for example, the expected utility function—and choice is thus the fundamental concept. 
Any assumption that one may make about expectations is really an assumption about the nature of choice. A much more 
literal interpretation of expectations is that they are real, meaning that they are independent entities that have some physi-
cal incarnation and that can in principle be accessed directly, for example by asking people to state them. Much can be said 
in favor of such a literal interpretation of expectations, not least that humans are able to express expectations even about 
variables that are irrelevant for their choices. But if expectations are independent entities, one should be able to inﬂuence 
them and thereby measure their effects on choice. This leads to the straightforward empirical question whether choices are 
driven by beliefs. We address this question in the context of trust games.
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beliefs—e.g. asserting the reality of climate change, or bolstering investor conﬁdence—to bring about behavioral change. But 
empirically, the role of beliefs needs to be examined. Researchers have increasingly turned to belief elicitation procedures 
where the agents state their expectations explicitly. Trust game experiments (following Berg et al., 1995) provide a frequent 
context for such methods. Fehr et al. (2003), Bellemare and Kröger (2007), Sapienza et al. (2013) and Naef and Schupp
(2009), among others, ask their experimental participants to state expectations on how much money other participants will 
return if trusted. They ﬁnd a strong correlation as well as much explanatory power when regressing the level of trust on 
stated expectations. Yet it remains unanswered whether the variance in trust arises because of the variance in stated beliefs 
or whether the co-variation in the two variables is driven by other, omitted variables that capture unobservable differences 
between the participants. For example, participants who are likely to trust others may also be relatively trustworthy and 
may project their own type onto others. The player’s type would be an omitted variable that creates an endogeneity problem 
for the data analyst. A natural reason for such a type-driven correlation between beliefs and actions is the perception of 
social norms. Among the experimental participants who are assigned the role of trustors, presumably some view a high 
investment in the game as the “right” thing to do, given that it maximizes social surplus. The social norm’s perception may 
depend on unobservable factors like the participants’ education, cultural inﬂuences or even the framing employed in the 
experiment. These unobservables likely inﬂuence both beliefs and actions. The same participant who invests a large amount 
may thus also predict that the participant in the other player role will return a large amount because this, too, is arguably 
the “right” thing to do. A positive correlation between beliefs and actions would arise—without implying anything about a 
causal inﬂuence of one variable on the other.1
Such a correlation is not necessarily a “behavioral” phenomenon but can arise as an equilibrium outcome of a natural 
game of incomplete information. We develop a simple illustration of this in Appendix A. Players interact in a mini trust game 
with just two actions for each player: whether to trust or not, and whether to reciprocate or not. Both players are aware 
of the social norm that prescribes trust and its reciprocation but there prevails some uncertainty about whether deviations 
from the norm will be sanctioned. Players receive correlated signals about the likelihood of sanctions. Appendix A shows 
that even with relatively little correlation between the players’ signals the Bayesian Nash equilibrium involves a strong 
correlation between the trustor’s own action and her belief about the opponent’s action. The driver of both variables is the 
trustor’s perception of the likelihood of sanctions (a variable that is omitted in most empirical analyses). The example also 
shows that despite the strong correlation between the trustor’s belief and action, an exogenous shift of the trustor’s belief 
about the opponent’s action has a relatively small effect on her action. It would therefore be misleading to interpret the 
strong correlation between beliefs and actions as evidence that one drives the other.
This example only suggests one particular omission in the analyst’s model—yet many other omitted variables apart from 
social norms might have an effect on actions and beliefs. The example’s message is merely that the players may well 
have good reasons (here, play an equilibrium in a larger game) to exhibit correlations between beliefs and actions that 
the researcher may mis-interpret as a causal relation. To measure the effect of a belief change on actions, one needs more 
powerful observations than simple correlations.
In Section 2, we describe a technique to measure the effect in the context of a trust game, involving the artiﬁcial creation 
of an instrumental variable. The creation of instrumental variables in the laboratory is a technique employed previously by 
Ham et al. (2005) and Gill and Prowse (2014)—they measure the causal role of endogenous variables other than beliefs 
and for different dependent variables. Our game is a simultaneous-move version of Berg et al. (1995) trust game and 
the instrument is a zero-mean random shift that exogenously increases or reduces the trustee’s level of re-payment. The 
realization of the random shift is known to the trustor, thus affecting her belief about the ﬁnal level of re-payment and 
potentially affecting her action. The trustee is informed of the existence of the shift and of its distribution. However, she is 
not informed about the realization of the shift, and her behavior remains unaffected by the realization.2 The trustor’s belief 
about the trustee’s behavior (her chosen level of re-payment prior to its manipulation through the shift) should therefore 
also be unaffected by the realization of the shift. Our data conﬁrm these predictions. At the same time, the beliefs about 
the payoff-relevant event—the level of re-payment including the shift—react strongly to the exogenous variation, which is 
necessary to apply an IV estimation. Regarding the “exclusion restriction” requirement of IV, that the instrument inﬂuences 
the actions only via the beliefs about the level of re-payment, we argue that it is natural to make this assumption because 
the instrument is an element of the statistic that the belief is formed about (the level of re-payment), and does not enter 
the interaction in any other way.
To check for the validity of the design, the trust game is played under two different conditions—with and without 
the instrument. The no-instrument condition is a control that serves two key purposes: it allows checking whether the 
introduction of the instrumentation technique has any undesirable inﬂuences on the data generating process and it generates 
the benchmark “naive” estimate of the connection between beliefs and actions. Consistent with the previous literature, we 
ﬁnd a strong correlation between the two variables. Crucially, the IV results indicate a causal link between beliefs and 
1 A downward bias may arise due to measurement error in the explanatory variable. Under classical errors-in-variables assumptions, our instrumental 
variable would address this issue but we do not pursue this argument further.
2 An experimental procedure that is related to ours is to replace one player’s choice by an exogenous random move as has been done in several 
experimental studies on reciprocity. See, in the context of the trust game, Cox (2004) among others. In short, these studies mainly differ from ours because 
they replace the trustor’s action by a random move, whereas we manipulate the trustee’s move.
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effect of beliefs on actions is 0.5 which is insigniﬁcantly smaller than the non-instrumented analysis suggests.
These ﬁndings constitute, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst evidence supporting that ﬁrst-order beliefs drive actions in the 
trust game. From a methodological point of view, our paper emphasizes the issue of causality in belief elicitation studies. 
Causal links between beliefs and actions were implicitly suggested not only in experiments with belief elicitation (McKelvey 
and Page, 1990; Offerman et al., 1996; Croson, 2000; Huck and Weizsäcker, 2002; Nyarko and Schotter, 2002, and many 
later studies) but also in survey studies that use stated expectations about relevant market variables (see Manski, 2004, and 
Attanasio, 2009, for useful overviews). Both literatures contain rich sets of observations that are consistent with a causal 
inﬂuence of beliefs on actions, but the endogeneity of beliefs and actions is rarely addressed in the analyses.3 , 4
2. Experimental design: instrumental variables for belief statements
Our experimental design revolves around a continuous trust game with two players. We study two versions of this game, 
the game with instrument (Condition I) and the game without instrument (Condition NI). In addition to the choice data we 
collect the trustors’ beliefs about the actions played by the trustees.
Condition NI serves as a control. First, it allows for a validity check of the instrument: whether or not it affects behavior 
in undesirable ways. In ﬁeld studies that involve IV methods, this is less of a concern as the instrument is usually part of the 
natural decision making environment. But with an artiﬁcial instrument we must check that the instrumentation technique 
is neutral in the sense that its presence alone does not distort the data generating process.
Second, and no less important, Condition I provides the main comparison benchmark for our IV results: it is the usual 
laboratory environment for trust games. Condition I’s non-instrumented estimates will also be reported but are only partially 
relevant because the instrumentation generates additional variance in beliefs. Under the hypothesis that an omitted variable 
is at work, a non-instrumented analysis on the data from Condition I yields a biased (attenuated) estimate of the relationship 
of interest.
We note that in all experimental sessions subjects also played a second type of trust game with binary actions. This 
game, too, was played in a variant with and a variant without an instrument. However, as documented extensively in the 
paper’s previous version (Costa-Gomes et al. 2010), the instrument employed in the binary trust game failed our tests for 
invasiveness and hence we focus here on the continuous trust game.5
For the collection of belief statements, we employ a quadratic scoring rule that is incentive compatible in the sense 
of theoretically eliciting the mean of the subjectively expected distribution, under the assumption that subjects are risk 
neutral.6
We conducted our experimental sessions at University College London and at the University of York, with a roughly equal 
number of subjects in each treatment at each location, as reported in Table 1. In all, 434 experimental subjects participated 
in our sessions. Subjects earn points by playing two games and one belief elicitation task, which are then converted into 
money at an exchange rate of 2.5 pence per point, resulting in an average variable payment of £13.12.7 Sessions lasted 
about 90 minutes from the moment the subjects were seated until leaving the laboratory after collecting their payments.
3 Notable exceptions are the papers by Bellemare, Kröger and van Soest (2008, 2011a) and Bellemare et al. (2011) who estimate structural econometric 
models that include covariance between beliefs and actions, and Smith (2013) who studies experimental public goods games and uses lagged actions by 
the opponent as instruments for stated beliefs. Bellemare, Kröger and van Soest study ﬁrst-order beliefs of proposers (2008) and responders (2011a) in 
the ultimatum game. Bellemare et al. (2011) study second-order beliefs in a sequential game akin to the trust game. Their structural models allow the 
parameters of an agent’s other-regarding preference to be jointly determined with beliefs—an endogeneity that is conﬁrmed in the data. Smith’s (2013) IV 
regressions in public goods games also point at a substantial endogeneity of actions and beliefs. Our results indicate only a milder endogeneity problem in 
the trust game.
4 A further important set of close relatives to our paper are ﬁeld experiments that vary informational conditions in different economic contexts, see e.g. 
Jensen (2010) and Dupas (2011). Another related literature is summarized in Guiso et al. (2006, 2009) showing evidence of a causal role of culture on both 
actions and beliefs.
5 The instrument used there is different from the instrument used in the continuous trust game and causes undesirable biases in beliefs. Speciﬁcally, 
25% of elicited beliefs in the binary game are justiﬁable only by prior beliefs that lie outside the probability simplex. In the paper’s earlier version we also 
carefully examine whether the continuous game data can be analyzed separately from the binary data. The experimental design involves four types of trust 
games (either continuous or binary and either with or without an instrument) and the protocol was such that each subject played just two games (without 
feedback) ensuring that she would play once in a binary and once in a continuous game, once with and once without an instrument, and once as a trustor 
and once as a trustee. We detected no spillover from the binary game onto the continuous trust game data.
6 The quadratic scoring rule has been used by numerous studies. Belief elicitation procedures usually do not generate large distortions of choice data (see, 
e.g., Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008) but some studies contain evidence on intrusive effects (Croson, 2000, and Rutström and Wilcox, 2009; Gächter 
and Renner, 2010). In our experiment, the danger of such an intrusion appears small, not least as we elicit beliefs after the choices. Nevertheless we 
readily admit that our method of payment could be cleaner as our subjects could in principle use their belief statements to hedge their positions. But such 
behavior would require considerable sophistication and risk aversion; existing evidence from controlled experiments (Blanco et al., 2010; Armantier and 
Treich, 2013) does not produce clear evidence that subjects rationally hedge in belief elicitation tasks. For recent discussions of belief elicitation methods 
see Armantier and Treich (2013) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014).
7 In addition, there was a show-up fee of £5 at UCL and £4 at York, chosen in each case so as to coincide with the show-up fee of a different experiment 
being run at the respective lab at the same time.
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Overview of experimental conditions.
Condition # York subjects # UCL subjects # Total subjects
I 124 120 244
NI 94 96 190
Fig. 1. Illustration of the continuous trust game with instrument. Player 2 knows only the distribution of z and chooses action a2. Player 1 knows the 
distribution of z and the value of z before choosing action a1 and belief statement b1. f (a1) indicates that player 2’s account balance depends on a1.
2.1. The continuous trust game and the shift instrument
Each of two players initially receives an “account” that contains 100 points. The trustor, here labeled “participant X”, 
chooses the share a1 of her points that are to be transferred to the trustee, “participant Y”. The transfer is productive—every 
point that the trustor sends is tripled on the way to the trustee. Simultaneously, i.e. without knowing the trustor’s transfer, 
the trustee decides how much to transfer back from the total that she has in her account after X’s transfer. The trustee, like 
the trustor, makes a decision about a relative “transfer share” a2, not an absolute amount.
The transfer shares a1 and a2 are restricted to lie in the interval [0.2, 0.8]. Thus the trustor can transfer between 20 and 
80 points, which are tripled and added to the trustee’s amount, resulting in an account balance for the trustee between 
160 and 340 points. Of these points, the trustee can transfer back a share of between 0.2 and 0.8 but has to do so without 
knowing the exact balance in her account.
The instrumental variable is a shift z that increases or decreases the trustee’s transfer share by a value between −0.2
and 0.2, drawn from a uniform probability distribution over the 41 values on the grid {−0.2, −0.19, ..., 0, ..., 0.19, 0.2}. Both 
participants are informed that the trustee’s transfer share a2 is added to the zero-mean random variable z. The trustor is, 
in addition, informed about the realized value of z, while the trustee is not.
For example, suppose that upon being informed that the realization of the shift z is 0.05, the trustor transfers a share 
a1 = 0.5 of her initial balance of 100 points. This would lead to intermediate account balances of 50 and 250 points for the 
trustor and trustee, respectively. Suppose further that the trustee decides to transfer a2 = 0.25. Hence, the actual transfer to 
the trustor would be a share of 0.3 (= 0.25 + 0.05) of the trustee’s intermediate balance, leading to ﬁnal balances of 125
and 175 points for the trustor and trustee, respectively. The game’s rules are illustrated in Fig. 1.
We explained the shifter z to participants as follows (for full instructions, see online Appendix C):
“There is one important detail about the transfer out of Participant Y’s account. The computer adjusts the share that is 
actually transferred from Participant Y’s account to Participant X’s account. More speciﬁcally, the computer will adjust 
Y’s transfer share in a random way, increasing or reducing it by up to 20 percentage points. That is, the computer will 
generate a number that we call “CHANGE TO Y’s TRANSFER SHARE” by picking a random percentage number among 
−20%, −19%, . . . , 0%, . . . , +19%, +20%. Each of the whole-numbered percentages in this range is equally likely.”
The instructions continue by giving a further illustration of the instrumental variable and its effects on payoffs.
After making their choices, the trustor is asked to report her belief statement about the trustee’s “adjusted transfer 
share”, i.e. about the sum ˜a2 = a2 + z. The belief statement is rewarded according to the quadratic scoring rule
πb = A − c(˜a2 − b1)2,
where b1 is Participant X’s belief statement about Participant Y’s transfer share, and the parameter values are A = c =
250 points.8 This elicitation procedure applies both when the game is played with and without the instrument—when 
8 Under the assumption of risk neutral subjective expected utility the agent maximizes A − c ∫ (˜a2 − b1)2dF (˜a2) where F is the subjective distribution 
function of random variable ˜a2. Reporting the mean of the distribution is optimal, as indicated by the ﬁrst-order condition, −2c
∫
(˜a2 − b1)dF (˜a2) = 0 ⇐⇒
b1 =
∫
a˜2dF (˜a2).
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choose the actions in the game, none of them is made aware of the subsequent belief elicitation task.
Importantly, the instrument z is generated independently of all other relevant random variables. This property justiﬁes 
the exogeneity assumption required for IV. Consider the bivariate linear projection of the trustor’s transfer share a1 on her 
stated beliefs b1:
a1 = β0 + β1b1 + u (1)
The “exclusion restriction” for OLS requires that while the error term u is potentially confounded with b1 e.g. due to 
omitted variables, the instrumental variable z is orthogonal to u. (In the regressions of the next section, we use Tobit 
instead of OLS models, but the same logic applies for Tobit. See e.g. Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a wider discussion of 
exclusion restrictions.9) The exclusion restriction is key for the causal inference—indeed we designed the experiment to 
make it maximally plausible. Since z is independently generated in the laboratory, we can rule out that u has an inﬂuence 
on z, or that any omitted variable may co-determine u and z. It remains an assertion that z does not inﬂuence u. We regard 
this as a reasonable assertion because z is a summand of a˜2, which is the statistic that beliefs b1 are formed about, and 
because z does not elsewhere enter the interaction. Section 3 will contain results that demonstrate that belief statements 
are indeed strongly responsive to z. In fact, participants respond in a way that is fully consistent with the hypothesis that 
they simply add z to their beliefs about a2.
We insert a note of caution about the simultaneous-move game: the trust game is usually played as a sequential game, 
where the trustor observes the trustee’s action before her own move. In such a sequential format reciprocal motives can 
inﬂuence the trustee’s decision process (see e.g. the results by Servatka et al., 2008). In our game, the anticipation of 
reciprocal behavior is impossible. More generally, using the simultaneous trust game simpliﬁes the trustor’s belief about the 
trustee’s transfer. (In the sequential version the trustor’s beliefs would specify such a distribution for each possible action 
of her own.)
3. Results
3.1. Preliminaries: data pooling, descriptive summary and checks for invasiveness of the instrument procedure
Data pooling.We ﬁrst determine whether there are any statistically signiﬁcant differences between the data collected at UCL 
and at York, and whether there are any order effects on either actions or stated beliefs (recall that each participant played 
two versions of the trust game). The absence of major differences allows us to pool the data and simplify the subsequent 
analysis.
Initially, we pair the two treatments in which the game was played under the same instrument condition at each of the 
locations, thereby testing for order effects. The absence of such order effects leads us to pool the data and test for laboratory 
effects, by comparing the data collected at the two different locations. We apply Kolmogorov–Smirnov’s two-sample exact 
test to both players’ transfer shares and to the trustor’s belief statements and ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant order or 
laboratory effects, for any of the player roles or for any instrument condition.10 Therefore, in the subsequent data analysis 
we use the pooled data played under each instrument condition.
Data summary and checks for invasiveness. As part of the data summary, we examine whether the presence of an instrument 
has undesired effects on how subjects play the games. More speciﬁcally, we check that the mere introduction of the instru-
ment does not affect the behavioral variables except through the channel of inﬂuencing the beliefs. We focus on the trustor’s 
data as the trustee’s role in this study is accessory and only serves the purpose of generating an uncertain re-payment.
Our ﬁrst step is to use the beliefs stated under Condition I (the beliefs about the trustee’s “adjusted” transfer share after 
manipulation through the instrument) to construct the underlying beliefs about the behavior of the human opponent. We 
then check whether these inferred underlying beliefs are “admissible”, i.e., whether one could hold such beliefs about the 
trustee’s transfer share. More concretely, suppose that upon being informed that the shift is equal to z the trustor states 
that her expectation of ˜a2 is a share equal to b1. Her underlying belief is then inferred to be b1 − z and the stated belief b1
is deemed “admissible” if the underlying belief b1 − z is in [0.2, 0.8], the interval of transfer shares the trustee can choose 
from. A stated belief whose underlying belief falls outside this interval is “inadmissible” and indicates a potential confusion 
9 In order to see how this property helps in ﬁnding the causal link between b1 and a1, consider the simple logic of two-stage least squares regression: 
the analyst regresses a1 on z, resulting in a slope coeﬃcient βa,z , and also regresses b1 on z, resulting in a coeﬃcient βb,z . If the only way in which z
inﬂuences a1 is through its effect on b1 (i.e. z and u are orthogonal), it follows that the effect of b1 on a1 must be 
βa,z
βb,z
times as large as the effect of z
on b1. That is, the causal effect of b1 on a1 is consistently estimated by 
βa,z
βb,z
.
10 The twelve tests on the order and laboratory effects all produced p-values above 0.1, with the exception of the test for order effects on the trustee’s 
transfer share in the instrument condition run at York, for which we obtain a p-value of 0.003. Since our data analysis focuses on the trustors, this rejection 
is not problematic.
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Means and standard deviations of behavioral variables and shift.
Condition NI I (all) I (“admissible” data)
Trustor’s transfer share 0.427 
(0.218)
0.435 
(0.226)
0.440 
(0.227)
Trustee’s transfer share 0.306 
(0.144)
0.303 
(0.150)
0.303 
(0.150)
Trustor’s belief about
adjusted transfer share a˜2
– 0.330 
(0.185)
0.331 
(0.178)
Trustor’s belief about 
transfer share a2
0.350 
(0.132)
– –
Shift z – 
(–)
−0.008
(0.121)
−0.013
(0.119)
on behalf of the trustor subject. We ﬁnd that only 5 subjects’ beliefs (4% of trustors in Condition I) are “inadmissible”, a low 
percentage.11 For consistency, we exclude these 5 subjects from the analysis, unless mentioned otherwise.
Next, we check whether the instrument has any undesirable effect on the choice variables. The shift’s expected value is 
zero, and thus we check that none of the choice variables exhibits a signiﬁcant change in means between the treatments 
with and without the shift. In the game without shift (Condition NI) the transfer shares of the trustors follow a familiar tri-
modal pattern that has been observed in many other trust game experiments, with substantial proportions of participants 
choosing the lowest possible transfer (here, a transfer share of 0.2, chosen by 32.6%), or the midpoint of the action space 
(0.5 transfer share, chosen by 19.0%) or the highest possible transfer share (0.8, chosen by 14.7%). The remaining observa-
tions are dispersed between these three modes. As can be seen in Table 2, the sample mean of the trustor’s transfer share 
is 0.427, with a standard deviation of 0.218. For comparison, in the game with instrument (Condition I) the frequencies of 
transfer shares that lie on the points of the simple three-point grid {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} are 29.9%, 7.7% and 19.7%, and the mean 
transfer share is 0.435 (std. dev. 0.226).12
We conclude that with the single exception of observing fewer transfer shares at level 0.5, the features of the action data 
under both conditions are very similar. In particular, their means are close to identical and a Mann–Whitney test cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are constant, at any conventional level. The same holds true for the trustees’ 
transfer shares.
Now consider the trustor’s belief about the trustee’s transfer share. In Condition NI, its mean is 0.350 (std. dev. 0.132), 
away from its target by less than 5 percentage points. The corresponding numbers for the game with the instrument, 
Condition I, are close in terms of mean (0.330) but the presence of the instrument induces additional variance in the belief 
statements—as it should because the shift is random and a rational subject adds the shift to her belief about the opponent. 
The size of the variance difference is very close to the predicted effect under the assumption that the subjects add the shift 
to their beliefs.13
Fig. 2 provides further evidence that subjects connect underlying beliefs and shifts in an additive way. In the ﬁgure, 
the thick (lower) line represents the target of the belief statements, which is given by the mean behavior of trustees in 
Condition I plus a trustor’s speciﬁc value of z. This line’s slope is equal to 1 and the set of points on the line corresponds 
to the set of ex-post optimal belief statements that the trustors would express if their beliefs were rational expectations 
about a2. For different underlying beliefs about a2, optimality requires different levels of belief statements but unvariably 
with a slope of 1. As the ﬁgure shows, a prominent feature of the data is that the large majority of (b1, z)-pairs indeed 
lie on straight lines with slope 1: 79.5% of observations in Fig. 2 are (b1, z)-pairs consistent with the hypothesis that the 
corresponding participant adds their value of z to a belief about a2 that lies on the grid {0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, ...}.14 The thin 
(upper) line is the Tobit regression line generated from the depicted data. The fact that the regression line has a slope 
11 Note that expressing an inadmissible belief is a strictly dominated decision, and that their low frequency is actually lower than the frequencies of 
dominated actions in games, see e.g. Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006). Additional evidence of a high level of logical consistency of trustors’ stated beliefs 
is provided by the frequencies of observing multiples of 5% in the data, referred to at the end of this subsection.
12 Note that, in Condition I, if the shift z weakly exceeds 0.14 it is a dominant strategy for the trustor to transfer a share of 0.8 because the amount that 
she transfers is multiplied by three and she is guaranteed to receive at least 0.34 of this total amount. In the 22 instances with shifts greater than or equal 
to 0.14, the trustors comply with this prediction 7 times. This is in line with other trust game data where trustors are often found not to trust fully even 
if it were to pay; see, for example, Bohnet et al. (2005) or Huck et al. (2012).
13 Under the assumption that the participants in Condition I arrive at their belief statements by simply adding the shift variable z to their (exogenous) 
belief about a2, the two variables “belief about a2” and z are independent and their sum of variances is thus equal to the variance of their sums. Counter-
factually assuming that subjects in Condition NI were to observe the same realizations of z and add them to their beliefs, one can analogously construct 
a variance of “hypothetical beliefs about ˜a2” in Condition NI, and compare it to the observed variance of beliefs about ˜a2 in Condition I. The comparison 
supports the hypothesis that beliefs about the underlying a2 are constant: the standard deviation of simulated beliefs in Condition NI is 0.181, very close 
to the standard deviation of stated beliefs in Condition I (0.178).
14 For comparison, in Condition NI, 90.5% of stated beliefs about the transfer share are multiples of 5%. Stated beliefs about the “adjusted transfer share” ˜a2
in Condition I are multiples of 5% in only 39.3% of all cases, indicating that many subjects form a well-deﬁned underlying belief on the grid and then add z. 
For further comparison, Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) also ﬁnd in their 3 × 3 games that subjects state beliefs that are multiples of 5 percentage 
points around 90% of the time.
304 M.A. Costa-Gomes et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) 298–309Fig. 2. Trustors’ stated beliefs upon observing transfer shifts z. Thick (lower) line: theoretical prediction under rational expectations (slope 1, “target” as 
described in main text). Thin (upper) line: Tobit regression line (slope 0.841, std. err. 0.116, 95% conf. int. [0.610, 1.072]).
coeﬃcient of 0.841 (std. err. 0.116) that is statistically indistinguishable from 1 is also consistent with the prediction that 
participants add the instrument to an underlying belief. Finally, a comparison of the second and third columns of Table 2
shows that the exclusion of the inadmissible data does not have much of an effect on the sample statistics.
In sum, the data analyses in this subsection show that introducing the instrument has no undesirable side effects on the 
distributions of the behavioral variables and that any differences conform to the theoretical predictions of the instrument’s 
effects. We therefore conclude that we can proceed to the IV analysis of data from Condition I and compare its results to 
the benchmark data from Condition NI.
3.2. Regression analysis: the causal effects of beliefs
In this subsection we present the regression results to assess the causality of beliefs for actions. We write trustor i’s 
transfer share a∗1i as a linear function of her stated belief b1i and a vector of control variables xi of self-reported demographic 
information, socio-economic indicators, cognitive skills, and measures of trust:
a∗1i = β0 + β1b1i + β2xi + ui (2)
Since a∗1i is censored at 0.2 and 0.8 we regard it as a latent variable that underlies the observed value a1i ,
15
a1i =
⎧⎨
⎩
0.2 if a∗1i < 0.2
a∗1i if 0.2 ≤ a∗1i ≤ 0.8
0.8 if a∗1i > 0.8
For the instrumentation in Condition I we also write trustor i’s stated belief b1i as a linear function of the transfer shift 
zi and control variables.16 While it would be desirable to do a nonlinear IV analysis of the connection between actions 
and beliefs, the number of observations only allows us a simple linear speciﬁcation—with nonlinear models any statistical 
inference with acceptable levels of power is beyond reach with our data.17 We ﬁrst use a two-limit censored Tobit model 
to estimate the relation between the trustors’ transfer shares a1i and their stated beliefs (as in expression (2)) in the NI 
data, both with and without control variables. This is the analysis that one would carry out in order to establish causality in 
the absence of endogeneity problems. The results are in Table 3 (standard errors in parentheses; detailed control variables 
estimates in Table 1A of online Appendix B). The Tobit estimates show a strong correlation of trustors’ stated beliefs and 
their transfer shares, with an average marginal effect of 0.722, see column (1).18 The corresponding slope coeﬃcient of the 
linear latent variable a∗1i is 1.317 (std. err. 0.288), but the average marginal effect (calculated via post-regression analysis) 
15 In Condition NI, 31 and 14 observations out of a total of 95 are at the lower and upper limits, respectively. In Condition I, 35 and 23 out of a total of 
117 observations are at the lower and upper limits, respectively.
16 The dependent variable is doubly censored at 0 and 1 but these two belief values appear in less than 5% of the observations.
17 Under the assumption of self-interested expected-value maximization, the predicted correspondence between beliefs and actions is a nonlinear step 
function where trustor i chooses the minimal possible share 0.2 if b1i lies below one third and the maximal share 0.8 otherwise. Empirically, 43% and 31% 
of observations in condition NI and condition I, respectively, conform with this prediction.
18 In this and subsequent tables, the goodness of ﬁt is measured by R̂2, denoting the correlation between predicted and the observed values of the 
dependent variable. The difference in the number of observations between columns (1) and (2) is due to non-response values in the personal questionnaire.
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Average marginal effects of trustors’ beliefs on trustors’ on trustors’ transfer shares (std. errors in paren-
theses).
Transfer share in Condition NI
(1) (2)
Tobit Tobit
Belief statement 0.722 (0.126) 0.890 (0.123)
Personal controls no yes
# of obs. 95 92
R̂2 0.214 0.402
Table 4
Average marginal effects of trustors’ beliefs on trustors’ transfer shares in Condition I (std. errors in parentheses).
Transfer share in Condition I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit
Belief statement 0.489 (0.102) 0.536 (0.104) 0.519 (0.171) 0.513 (0.190)
Personal controls no yes no yes
# of obs. 117 116 117 116
R̂2 0.149 0.254 0.149 0.254
takes into account also the effect of data censoring at transfer shares of 0.2 and 0.8. That is, on average for all observations, 
including those at the boundary, an increase in the belief of 10 percentage points translates into an increase of 7.2 percent-
age points in the transfer share. In the regression with controls, the estimated effect is even larger, with a slope of 1.638
(std. err. 0.308) that translates into an average marginal effect of 0.89, see column (2).19
A “naive” attribution of these statistical connections to a causal effect would thus suggest that beliefs are a strong 
driver of trust. The paper’s main question is whether this attribution can be corroborated by the IV results. Table 4 has 
the IV Tobit results from Condition I, showing that the answer is aﬃrmative. As indicated in column (3) of Table 4, the IV 
average marginal effect from a regression without control variables is estimated at 0.519, with an estimated slope coeﬃcient 
of 1.004 (std. err. 0.389). This is insigniﬁcantly smaller than the non-instrumented estimated in Condition NI, indicating 
that no strong endogeneity exists.20 A further indication that there is no strong endogeneity problem is that the size of 
the IV-estimated effect is very similar to that of the shift itself: In a Tobit regression of a1i on z (see Table A3 in online 
Appendix B) we estimate an average marginal effect of 0.422 (std. err. 0.168). However, the most important aspect of the IV 
results of Table 4 is that the IV-estimated effect of beliefs is substantial and signiﬁcantly different from zero. To the best of 
our knowledge this is the ﬁrst direct evidence that the correlation between ﬁrst-order beliefs and actions in an experimental 
trust game is indeed causal.
The results also show that within Condition I, there is no discernible difference in the results of Tobit versus IV Tobit. 
This is another indication that there cannot be a strong omitted-variable problem. One may worry about the observation 
that the Tobit coeﬃcients differ between Conditions NI and I. The difference is insigniﬁcant, however, in a Tobit regression 
that includes all main and interaction effects of conditions and belief statements.21
4. Conclusion
The paper makes two contributions. First, adding to the related literature discussed in the Introduction, it establishes 
that there is a causal link between ﬁrst-order beliefs and actions in an investment/trust game. The ﬁnding conﬁrms the 
implicit supposition of such a link in many previous analyses of stated beliefs. The question of causality between beliefs 
in other people’s trustworthiness and actions is potentially relevant for many applied policy issues. Every situation is dif-
ferent, however, and we point out that our “positive” evidence may not generalize to contexts outside the clean laboratory 
environment.
19 The estimates in online Appendix B show that age has a statistically signiﬁcantly negative effect on the transfer share, while the subject’s father’s level 
of education, living with a partner, and having a loan as the main source of income have signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients. However, none of these four 
effects extends to the data from Condition I.
20 To obtain a statistical test for the comparison, we use the estimated standard deviations of both slope coeﬃcient estimates. The estimates are in-
dependent and asymptotically normal. Under the null hypothesis of equal slope coeﬃcients, the standard deviation of the difference between the slope 
estimates is thus estimated as 
√
0.3892 + 0.2882 = 0.484. The estimated slope difference of 1.317 − 1.004 = 0.313 is within one estimated standard de-
viation around zero and has a t-value of 0.3130.484 = 0.647. Comparing the coeﬃcients from regressions with controls, the analogous standard deviation is √
0.4082 + 0.3082 = 0.511 and the slope difference has a t-value of 1.638−0.9590.511 = 1. 329.
21 To the extent that there is a difference between the two treatments, it could be generated by reciprocity: under Condition NI, trustors may want to be 
kind to their opponents if they expect them to be kind as well. In Condition I, part of the belief is driven by the computer draw, so a reciprocal agent may 
respond less to this belief.
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instruments—that can also be employed to examine other questions. It has always been the hallmark of experimental eco-
nomics to manipulate directly the explanatory variables of interest, allowing causal insight. Indeed, this is the main reason 
for why experiments have become so popular. But in some contexts, the explanatory variable of interest is by its very na-
ture an endogenous variable, and thus cannot be fully controlled even by an experimenter. Yet in such contexts, one can at 
least inﬂuence the explanatory variable of interest to some degree, by way of using instrumental variables. Under standard 
linearity assumptions, this suﬃces to measure causal links. Non-linear speciﬁcations may follow in subsequent research, as 
may the combination of exogenous randomization with structural-model estimations. Similar procedures to ours may also 
be applied in studies where the explanatory variable of interest is of a different nature, but is likewise endogenous to the 
choice process: for example, information about past outcomes, responses to attitudinal questions, happiness reports or even 
neurological data. To our knowledge, Ham et al. (2005) and Gill and Prowse (2014) are the only previous papers that employ 
a truly exogenous instrumental variable created in a laboratory—they study the effects of cash balances in auction bidding 
and, respectively, of past successes in tournament games.22
An unusual feature of our study is that we explicitly question the link between expectations and actions—yet traditionally 
expectations are, at least under subjective expected utility, not viewed as a concept that is separate from actions. We 
acknowledge that we do not offer an alternative deﬁnition of expectations or a general decision-theoretic view on the topic, 
instead we simply take belief statements as our data. But the statistical establishment of a causal link between expectations 
and actions is at least pragmatic. Indeed the empirical link may be the only thing that matters for a policy maker who runs 
a campaign to change expectations in order to accomplish a behavioral change.
Appendix A. An example of naive inference under omitted variables and equilibrium play
In this section we give an example of how the correlation between belief statements and actions can be misleading in 
the presence of omitted variables. To arrive at a “misleading” effect, we imagine that a researcher observes the full data 
(choices and belief statements about the opponent’s choices) but ignores the possibility of a social norm, or any other 
unobserved variable, that could drive behavior and belief statements. The players, in contrast, are aware of the full model 
and play the unique Bayes–Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game.
The example builds on a 2 × 2 mini trust game, where player 1 can either trust (a1 = 1) or not (a1 = 0) and player 
2 can reciprocate (a2 = 1) or not (a2 = 0). The players are aware of a social norm that prescribes trust and reciprocation 
(a1 = a2 = 1). A random event speciﬁes whether violations of the social norm are sanctioned: in state ω = 1, violations are 
sanctioned, and we assume that this state arises with probability 12 . If ω = 1 occurs, player i’s utility is penalized by a term 
γi if she does not comply with the norm but plays ai = 0 instead. The punishment parameter γi is known to the player 
herself but not to her opponent, who only knows the distribution of γi to be uniform over [0, 1]. If ω = 0, no punishment 
applies.
A possible justiﬁcation for such a probabilistic social norm enforcement is that with probability 12 the interaction does 
not remain anonymous. For example, an outside observer (say, the experimenter) may impose a punishment γi on non-
cooperative play. Or, the players meet afterwards and may be compelled to reveal their play in the game. In this case, the 
punishment parameter γi would reﬂect the extent of embarrassment. The payoffs (π1, π2) in the two states are as follows.
ω = 0 Player 2
a2 = 0 a2 = 1
Player 1 a1 = 0 0,0 0,0
a1 = 1 −1,2 1,1
ω = 1 Player 2
a2 = 0 a2 = 1
Player 1 a1 = 0 −γ1,−γ2 −γ1,0
a1 = 1 −1,2− γ2 1,1
We assume that the two punishment terms γ1 and γ2 are i.i.d. uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. The worst 
feasible punishment, γi = 1, makes the non-cooperative action ai = 0 weakly dominated for player i, under state ω = 1. 
The smallest possible punishment for player 2, γ2 = 0, makes player 2’s non-cooperative action a2 = 0 weakly dominant 
(independent of ω). Player 1’s optimal action depends on ω, too, but as usual in the trust game it also depends on her 
belief about a2—for a large expected return, it pays to trust.
While players do not know the true state ω for sure, they each receive a signal si that has precision 
2
3 . That is, Pr(si =
1|ω = 1) = Pr(si = 0|ω = 0) = 23 , for i = 1, 2. Their information about ω is therefore correlated: players know that it is more 
likely than not that the opponent receives the same signal. The probability of the opponent having the same signal is 59
(and the correlation coeﬃcient between the two players’ signals is 19 ).
In this Bayesian game, a player’s type is given by her signal si and her punishment payoff γi . We assume for simplicity 
that the punishments (γ1, γ2) are independent of the signals (s1, s2). It is then straightforward to determine the players’ 
optimal choice probabilities: for any signal si and any belief about the opponent’s strategy, we ﬁrst ask what values of γi
22 In the literature on ﬁeld experiments, artiﬁcial instruments have been employed to measure the effect of information (Duﬂo and Saez, 2003) or 
technology adoption (Devoto et al., 2012) or to avoid selection effects in subsequent experimental interaction of participants (List and Millimet, 2008).
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for γi ≥ γ̂i(si), the player chooses ai = 1. Each player i employs two such cutoffs, one for each signal realization, si ∈ {0, 1}. 
Player i also entertains a belief about the opponent’s cooperation: Pr(a j = 1|si) =∑s˜ j∈{0,1} Pr(s j = s˜ j |si)(1 −Pr(γ j < γ̂ j(s˜ j))). 
This belief determines player i’s two cutoffs, and the BNE solution is then found by solving for a set of four cutoffs that 
form a ﬁxed point. To ﬁnd the solution, we aggregate over the possible range of punishment parameters and denote the 
choice probabilities under the players’ equilibrium strategies by r = Pr(a1 = 1|s1 = 0) = 1 − γ̂1(s1 = 0), s = Pr(a1 = 1|s1 =
1) = 1 − γ̂1(s1 = 1), t = Pr(a2 = 1|s2 = 0) = 1 − γ̂2(s2 = 0), and u = Pr(a2 = 1|s2 = 1) = 1 − γ̂2(s2 = 1). To ﬁnd e.g. the cutoff 
value γ̂1(s1 = 1) that makes player 1 indifferent upon signal s1 = 1, we solve
E
[
π1
(
a1 = 0
∣∣s1 = 1, γ̂1(s1 = 1))]= E[π1(a1 = 1∣∣s1 = 1, γ̂1(s1 = 1))]
2
3
(−γ̂1(s1 = 1))= Pr(a2 = 0|s1 = 1) · (−1) + Pr(a2 = 1|s1 = 1) · 1
which can be rewritten as:
s = 3
2
(
8
9
t + 10
9
u
)
− 1
2
Formulating analogous expressions for r, t and u allows to solve for the unique equilibrium values {r = 0, s = 35 , t = 15 ,
u = 12 }. We see that in equilibrium, both players react strongly to their signals as s exceeds r and u exceeds t , both by a 
considerable margin.23
Now consider a naive researcher who wants to infer the causal effect of player 1’s beliefs on her actions. We deﬁne a 
naive researcher as one who is not aware that the information structure determines the players’ beliefs and actions. Rather, 
the researcher views the players’ beliefs as exogenous and does not require that they are in equilibrium. The researcher 
collects player-1 data on actions and belief statements about player-2 actions, which we assume are reported truthfully, 
generated by the full model with social norms. The researcher will therefore observe two different belief statements: ﬁrst, 
when player 1 receives the signal s1 = 1, she reports the belief that her opponent cooperates with probability
Pr(a2 = 1|s1 = 1) = 5
9
u + 4
9
t = 11
30
.
Under this signal realization s1 = 1, we saw above that her actions are cooperative with probability 35 . Second, when player 
1 receives the signal s1 = 0 she reports that her opponent cooperates with probability
Pr(a2 = 1|s1 = 0) = 4
9
u + 5
9
t = 1
3
,
and her actions under this signal realization are cooperative with probability 0. The data on player 1 that the researcher 
observes can therefore be summarized in the following table (where the cell entries indicate the relative frequency of the 
four possible belief-action pairs):
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 = 1130 bs1 = 13
Actions a1 = 0 210 12
a1 = 1 310 0
As the naive researcher ignores the existence of the social norm, he will also wrongly assign causal effects: we assume 
that he attributes any change in actions exclusively to changes in beliefs. (We also assume that the researcher is not puzzled 
by the fact that not all actions are best responses to stated beliefs. One could write down a simple error model of what the 
researcher has in mind, but this would not add much beyond the verbal statement in the sentence before these parentheses.) 
He therefore believes that if he could intervene and inﬂuence players’ beliefs, he would also inﬂuence players’ actions 
as prescribed by the frequencies in the data matrix. In particular, let us suppose that he thinks he could convince all 
members of the player-1 population who hold the belief of 13 (i.e. one half of the population) to increase their belief by
1
30 . 
These player 1s would then hold the same belief as the other half of the population. After such an intervention, the naive 
23 The equilibrium is in (essentially) pure strategies, as a player with a given type has a strict best response, except for the zero-probability event that her 
realized value γi makes her indifferent, i.e. γi = γ̂i(si).
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matrix. He would thus expect the following data after the intervention:
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 = 1130 bs1 = 13
Actions a1 = 0 25 0
a1 = 1 35 0
But what would the actual effects be of such an intervention, given the true model? To ﬁnd the answer, the researcher 
could use a simple announcement: he could address all player 1s whose belief statement is 13 , explaining to them that in 
one out of 20 times, their opponent would be replaced by a robot that always cooperates.24 In the above equilibrium, and 
starting from the belief 13 , a player with signal s1 = 0 would indeed arrive at a belief that the opponent cooperates with 
probability 1130 , as one can easily check:
Pr(opponent cooperates|s1 = 0) = 19
20
Pr(a2 = 1|s1 = 0) + 1
20
= 19
20
1
3
+ 1
20
= 11
30
Under the true model, what would be the effect of the announcement on player 1’s cooperation rate? What the naive 
researcher misses is that even under the above announcement, a player 1 with signal s1 = 0 would still assign a low 
probability to the event that a non-cooperative action would be penalized. She would therefore still ﬁnd the non-cooperative 
action a1 = 0 relatively attractive—the omitted variable thus reduces the beneﬁcial effect of the belief shift.
To ﬁnd the size of the effect, we consider the relevant cutoff γ̂1(s1 = 0), after the announcement. The indifference 
condition is:
E
[
π1
(
a1 = 0
∣∣s1 = 0, γ̂1(s1 = 0))]= E[π1(a1 = 1∣∣s1 = 0, γ̂1(s1 = 0))]
1
3
(−γ̂1(s1 = 0))= 19
20
(
Pr(a2 = 1|s1 = 0)1+
(
1− Pr(a2 = 1|s1 = 0)
)
(−1))+ 1
20
1
1
3
(−γ̂1(s1 = 0))= 19
20
(
1
3
− 2
3
)
+ 1
20
1
γ̂1(s1 = 0) = 4
5
Thus only a proportion of Pr(γ1 ≥ 45 ) = 15 of the players with s1 = 0 would cooperate and the new data matrix after the 
announcement is
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 = 1130 bs1 = 13
Actions a1 = 0 35 0
a1 = 1 25 0
We conclude that by looking at the frequencies instead of measuring the effect, the naive researcher would considerably 
overestimate the causal link between beliefs and actions. Under the true model, only one ﬁfth of the announcement’s 
recipients would change their actions.
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.006.
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